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ABSTRACT 
 
Although China is not a federal country, its public finance system does carry 
features of fiscal federalism. Since 1949, although the central government 
has consistently sought to exercise strong control over the country, it has at 
times done so by decentralist rather than centralist policies. The Dengist 
policies since economic reform began, for example, have had a strongly 
decentralist element, with continuing devolvement of control to the 
provincial governments, sometimes to such a degree that some observers 
have commented: “the centre pretends to rule and the provinces pretend to 
be ruled”. This is also a period that witnessed the revival of old regionalisms, 
as well as the creation of new regionalisms brought about by increased 
local autonomy, rapid economic growth and increasingly globalizing trade 
and business linkages. While the oft-cited “China deconstructs” scenario 
seems at present far-fetched, the challenges posed by central-peripheral 
conflicts, ethnic resource contest and ethnoterritorial aspirations are real, in 
particular as they are being exacerbated by the country’s “retreat from 
equality” and growing interregional economic disparity. In the light of these 
daunting exigencies, this paper explores the political economy of regional 
development in China, focusing on the intricate link between the country’s 
ethnic diversity and the role of the State in the economy, as the Asian giant 
warily enters a new stage of economic reform.1
 
Keywords:  China, regionalism, ethnic diversity, inequalities, uneven 
development, regional disparities 
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 Introduction 
 
Despite the highly remarkable economic achievement over the past 
two decades, China is facing acute problems on various fronts, not least of 
which being her expanding interregional and urban-rural disparities. 
Agriculture accounted for only about 14.6 per cent of China’s GDP in 2003 
but 49.5 per cent of her labour force, while up to 59.5 per cent of the 
country’s total population is rural. This is in addition to the fact that only 13 
per cent of China consists of arable land and the country has 40 per cent 
less arable land per capita than anywhere else in the world. Hence, with 
more people and less arable land in rural areas, the country has a lower 
comparative advantage in agriculture, and hence investments have been 
concentrated in the cities and industries and this has led to increasing rural-
urban disparities in socioeconomic development and income distribution (Bi 
2005: 114), as well as the increasingly alarming socioeconomic disparity 
between the country’s eastern, coastal regions and the inland, especially 
western, regions. 
 
Many different factors have led to the disparity between China’s 
eastern and western regions. In the modern history of the country, the 
coastal belt has been the focus of foreign influence and the site of foreign 
concessions and open cities, with business and production bases 
established there to take advantage of the convenience of import and 
export facilities. Hence, ironically, it was the foreign powers who first 
stimulated China’s industrial development, mainly in the coastal cities – and 
Shanghai in particular. This imbalance in favour of the coastal belt was 
accentuated further in the 1930s by the Japanese take-over of Manchuria 
where the puppet state of “Manchukuo” was established as an industrial 
centre, concentrating on heavy industry and mining (in contrast with the 
other foreign treaty ports and concessions that concentrated more upon the 
light industries), to feed Japan’s industrial and military needs. 
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 Besides such historical factors, geographical location also 
contributed to the east-west disparity. The eastern coastal regions have 
benefited from the availability of widespread, interconnected water and land 
freight lines – such as the Yangzi River (Chang Jiang), the Beijing-
Guangzhou and Beijing-Shanghai railway lines – that have greatly 
facilitated the transportation of people and merchandize. The western 
regions generally lack connexions to major domestic and foreign markets, 
except some cities that are located along the main east-west railway lines 
and the Yangzi River. The high population density and bigger urban sector 
of the eastern coastal regions also give them an advantage over the inland 
regions. Even their rural areas resemble large urban centres. Their 
residents thus have better access to regional, provincial or national 
commercial markets around them. The large and extensive consumer 
markets represent a boon to more production and sales2 (Zhou 2006: 251). 
Furthermore, under the Dengist market-oriented reforms and open-door 
policy, the eastern regions – the open economic zones like Shenzhen in 
particular – were the first to benefit from all sorts of investments – from 
government-funded infrastructure to the injection of foreign capital, including 
those from overseas Chinese, who in their first business foray back to the 
land of their ancestors, often prefer to begin with investing in their ancestral 
province, village or county where, for many, their relatives still live. Despite 
guidelines for more balanced investment strategies, in a scenario akin to 
the flypaper hypothesis, increasing economic prosperity in eastern China 
was creating more and more business opportunities, better projects and 
higher returns, compared with the inland regions, and hence attracting more 
and more State funding and private investment even from the other parts of 
the country. As projects in the eastern, coastal regions are more likely to be 
approved due to the better prospects, they tend to attract surplus and 
unused funds from the other regions. All these had resulted in the ever-
growing disparity between the eastern and western regions during the 
1990s. Furthermore, preferential treatments – in taxation, tariffs, approval of 
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 joint ventures with overseas companies, etc. – during the three decades of 
reform contributed greatly to the prosperity of the eastern, coastal regions, 
in addition to the leeway they were given in experimenting with new 
economic measures. 
 
 
Inequality and Poverty: The Regional Dimension 
 
While China’s reforms have been successful in giving many people 
higher incomes and producing more goods and services, they also led to 
increasingly acute inequality in income and wealth among the populace. 
From one of the most egalitarian societies in the 1970s, China has turned 
into one of the most unequal countries in the region and even among 
developing countries in general. The unusually rapid rise in inequality had 
led to the Gini coefficient of household income rising by 7 percentage points 
(18 percent), or by 1.0 percentage point per year, between 1988 and 1995. 
Inequality of rural household income per capita increased by about 23 per 
cent over the period, and that of the urban household income per capita by 
42 per cent (Riskin, Zhao and Li 2001: 3). As Bert Hoffman of the World 
Bank recently noted, China’s Gini rose from 0.25 – equal to that of 
Germany – in 1980 to about 0.45 today, as the country becomes less equal 
than Russia or the United States of America. In the 1980s the richest 10 per 
cent of the people of China earned 7 times the income of the poorest 10 per 
cent, today they earn more than 18 times as much.3 Or as another observer 
put it, “Ever since the early years of reforms, the divide between the rich 
and the poor had been emerging, and it is now getting to the stage of 
ripping the entire society apart.” (Zhou 2006: 286). 
 
With official poverty line set at an annual income of 625 yuan per 
capita, the rural population living in poverty in 2002 numbered 28.2 million. 
If the line were raised to 825 yuan, as it has been in more recent years, the 
number would be 90 million. If the United Nations’ definition of the poverty 
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 line at US$1 income per day (i.e. about 3000 yuan per year) is used, the 
number in poverty, both rural and urban, would be greatly increased (ibid.: 
288). 
 
According to Ohara (2001), by the yardstick of China’s government, 
with a poverty line of (annual) 100 yuan per capita in 1978, the country had 
a poverty population of 250000000 and an incidence of poverty of 30.7 per 
cent. The figures for the subsequent years are 206 (poverty line), 
125000000 (poverty population), 14.8 (incidence of poverty) in 1985; 300, 
85000000, 10.1 in 1990; 317, 80000000, 9.4 in 1992; 440, 70000000, 8.2 in 
1994; 580, 58000000, 7.6 in 1996; and 635, 42100000, 5.8 in 1998. With a 
poverty line of 625 yuan in 1999, the poverty population was 34000000. The 
poverty population declined to 26000000 in 2000, with an incidence of 
poverty of less than 3. However, if the international yardstick were to be 
employed, with the poverty line set at (daily) 1 dollar per capita, the poverty 
population would have been 263 million in 1990, i.e. an incidence of poverty 
of 31.3 per cent. With the same poverty line of 1 dollar per capita per day, 
the figures for subsequent years were 255 million (poverty population), 30.1 
(incidence of poverty) in 1992; 222 million, 25.9 in 1994; 130 million, 15.0 in 
1996; and 106 million, 11.1 in 1998. (Ohara 2001: 54, Table 1). 
 
In line with the now well-known fear of instability (luan) on the part of 
China’s ruling Communist Party, the main objective of the country’s poverty 
alleviation policy is to prevent income and wealth inequality from growing 
out of political control, by attempting to improve the economic position of the 
poorest through considerably limited administrative intervention. 
Furthermore, discontent brewing in the areas resided by ethnic minorities is 
taken seriously because these areas are also places that show a relative 
concentration of poor people. Just how the western regions populated by 
the non-Han peoples have been left behind China’s economic development 
is clearly indicated by the poverty problem. Any political or social instability 
especially in these ethnic minority areas could have grave ramifications 
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 throughout the economy that threaten the development efforts of the central 
government especially in regard to the development of the regional cores.  
 
Table 1 China:  Interregional Income Disparity (income index:  1 
for the eastern regions) 
          
Year Eastern 
Regions 
Central 
Regions 
Western 
Regions 
1978 1 0.67 0.55 
1980 1 0.68 0.56 
1985 1 0.67 0.55 
1990 1 0.64 0.55 
1993 1 0.53 0.45 
1995 1 0.54 0.43 
1997 1 0.56 0.43 
1999 1 0.54 0.41 
2000 1 0.51 0.39 
2001 1 0.50 0.39 
2002 1 0.49 0.39 
2003 1 0.48 0.38 
2004 1 0.48 0.38 
 
Source:  Computed with data from the China Statistical Yearbook, 
various years. 
 
Table 2    China: Incidence of Poverty by Province (sheng), 
Zizhiqu+ and Zhixiashi++ (%), at end of 1996 [Within category by 
alphabetical order) 
 
<5% 10 – 20% 
Beijing (Zhixiashi) Chongqing* (Zhixiashi) 
Fujian Guizhou* 
Guangdong Guangxi* (Zhuang Zizhiqu) 
Hainan Hebei 
Jiangsu Heilongjiang 
Shanghai (Zhixiashi) Henan 
Tianjin (Zhixiashi) Jilin 
Zhejiang Ningxia* (Hui Zizhiqu) 
 Shaanxi* 
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 5 – 10% Shanxi 
Anhui Sichuan* 
Hubei Xinjiang* (Uygur Zizhiqu) 
Hunan Xizang/Tibet*(Tibetan Zizhiqu)
Jiangxi Yunnan* 
Liaoning  
Shandong >20% 
 Gansu* 
 InnerMongolia* (Mongol Zizhiqu) 
 Qinghai* 
 
+ “autonomous region”, ++“direct-ruled/independent municipality”, i.e. 
municipality under the central government. 
* provinces, zizhiqu, and zhixiashi now classified as the “western 
regions” 
Source:  Tabulated with data from Ohara (2001: 56). 
 
When the poverty counties (331 in total) were first designated in 
1986, about 70 per cent of the country’s poor lived in these counties. In 
1993, 73 per cent of the poor population of 80 million resided in these 
counties. The majority – about two-thirds – of China’s poor are found in the 
inland (central and western) regions, especially the western regions. Indeed 
the designated poverty counties are relatively concentrated in the western 
regions – Yunnan (73), Shaanxi (50), Sichuan (43), Gansu (41) and 
Guizhou (40), according to Ohara (2001: 64) who also shows that there has 
been improvement (reduction in regional percentage of poor counties) in the 
eastern regions, thanks to the economic growth, but not in the central and 
western regions. The priority targets of the State’s poverty relief measures 
are the southwestern populous regions of Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan and 
Shaanxi that have relatively high incidence of poverty, as well as the ethnic 
Zhuang zizhiqu of Guangxi. Poverty alleviation faces more problems in the 
more sparsely populated regions like Inner Mongolia, Gansu and Qinghai 
that have the highest incidence of poverty (more than 20 per cent) as well 
as Tibet and Xinjiang (10–20 per cent) – regions all characterized by 
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 deserts, heights and mountainous areas. Ohara’s figures indicate that 
poverty counties totaled 21,770,000 in 1998, with 10.6 per cent (2,040,000) 
of which found in the eastern regions, 33.1 per cent (7,500,000) in the 
central regions, and 56.4 per cent (12,230,000) in the western regions. In 
1999, poverty counties totaled 18,000,000, of which 9.4 per cent (1,900,000) 
were in the eastern regions, 34.5 per cent (6,950,000) in the central regions, 
and 56.2 per cent (10,150,000) in the western regions. (Ohara 2001: 55, 
Table 2)4
 
Such disparities also gave the richer provinces a significant 
advantage in terms of revenue collections since these are determined by 
income level and tax effort, as can be observed in Table 3 below. 
 
Table 3 China:  Fiscal and Economic Concentration in Rich# and 
Poor# Provinces (sheng), Zizhiqu+ and Zhixiashi++ (%) 
 
Year 2003 2004 
Five richest provinces *   
Percentage of GDP 26.10 25.70
Percentage of population 13.10 13.35
Percentage of government revenue 37.62 36.96
Percentage of government expenditure 27.44 27.06
   
Five poorest provinces **   
Percentage of GDP 8.73 8.73 
Percentage of population 17.23 17.22
Percentage of government revenue 8.79 8.80 
Percentage of government expenditure 12.60 12.37
 
# by GDP per capita
+ “autonomous region”, ++“direct-ruled/independent municipality”, i.e. 
municipality under the central government. 
* Beijing, Zhejiang, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Guangdong. 
** Guizhou, Gansu, Guangxi, Yunnan, and Anhui. 
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 Source: Computed with data from the China Statistical Yearbook, 
various years. 
 
The Rural Social Economy Survey Group of China’s State Statistical 
Bureau published in 2000 the results of an analysis of the different 
characteristics of poor and not-so-poor rural families sampled in four 
regions of the country5: 
 
Region 1 – the coastal provinces/zhixiashi of Beijing, Fujian, 
Guangdong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Tianjin and Zhejiang. Consisting of the 
richest regions in China, Region 1 has only 2.9 per cent of the country’s 
total poor. The incidence of poverty is 1.6 per cent or less in the provinces 
and no higher than 0.5 per cent in Jiangsu, Shanghai and Tianjin. With the 
poor sparsely scattered and poverty mainly reflects family or individual 
differences but not regional characteristics, rural poverty problem no longer 
appears to be a regional issue here.  
 
Region 2 – the provinces/zizhiqu/zhixiashi of Anhui, Chongqing, 
Guangxi, Hainan, Hebei, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Liaoning, 
Shandong, Shanxi and Sichuan. Though the incidence of poverty is 
moderate at about 2–7 per cent, Region 2 accounts for 55 per cent of the 
country’s total poor partly due to the large regional population. 
Concentrations of the poor exist in the mountainous areas in Hubei, 
Sichuan and Chongqing, but in general, the poor are thinly scattered across 
Region 2. 
 
Region 3 – the southwestern and northwestern remote 
provinces/zizhiqu of Gansu, Guizhou, Ningxia, Shaanxi, Qinghai, Xinjiang 
and Yunnan. Among the four Regions, this one faces the most severe 
poverty problems, with an incidence of poverty above 9 per cent and 
accounts for 35 per cent of the country’s extreme poor. 
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 Region 4 – the cold, northern provinces/zizhiqu of Heilongjiang, Inner 
Mongolia and Jilin. Though with only 7 per cent of the country’s total poor 
population, this Region suffers from the relatively high poverty incidence of 
6–8 per cent. 
 
Such regional classification by the Survey Group provides, to a 
certain extent, some idea about the causes of poverty that vary from region 
to region, for instance, geographical terrain that may have implications for 
market competitive advantage. Table 4 below provides a more detailed 
description of the regions. 
 
Table4 China: Population, Output and Income Indicators by 
Regions 
 
 
                                Inland              
Region 
 
Item 
 
National 
 
Eastern (Coastal)* 
 
Inland# Central** Western# 
Year 2003 2004 2003 2004 2003 2004 2003 2004 2003 2004 
Populati
on (1000 
persons) 
1283733 1294150 486212.5 492510 797520.5 801640 428287.2 430370 369233.3 371270 
   
Share 
(%) 
100 100 37.87 38.06 62.13 61.94 33.36 33.26 28.76 28.69 
GDP 
(100 
million 
yuan) 
135539.
14 
163240.
43 
79283.40 95305.75 56255.74 67934.68 33301.08 40349.5
1 
22954.66 27585.1
7 
   
Share 
(%) 
100 100 58.49 58.38 41.51 41.62 24.57 24.72 16.94 16.90 
GDP per 
capita 
(yuan) 
10558.2
0 
12613.7
2 
16306.33 19351.03 7053.83 8474.46 7775.41 9375.54 6216.85 7429.95 
     Ratio 
to   
nationa
l  
   
Average 
1 1 1.54 1.53 0.67 0.67 0.74 0.74 0.59 0.59 
Urban 
disposa
ble 
income 
per 
capita 
(yuan) 
8472.20 9421.61 10365.80 11522.87 7155.78 7929.17 7036.36 7828.80 7235.39 7996.08 
     Ratio 
to   
national  
   
Average 
1 1 1.22 1.22 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.85 0.85 
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 Rural 
net 
income 
per 
capita 
(yuan) 
2622.24 2936.4 4160.42 4564.78 2115.51 2389.54 2407.36 2770.18 1920.95 2135.78 
     Ratio 
to   
national  
   
average 
1 1 1.59 1.55 0.81 0.81 0.92 0.94 0.73 0.73 
    
# Including Guangxi which is geographically eastern coastal, and 
Inner Mongolia which is geographically northeastern inland. 
* Excluding Guangxi. 
** Excluding Inner Mongolia. 
Source: Computed with data from the China Statistical Yearbook, 
various years. 
 
Table 4 shows that the inland regions’ GDP in 2003 and 2004 only 
accounts for 41–42 per cent of the national total, although these regions 
hold 62 per cent of the country’s total population. Of the inland regions, the 
western (including Guangxi and Inner Mongolia) have a combined GDP of 
merely 17 per cent of the national total, although they have 29 per cent of 
China’s total population. The inland regions’ GDP per capita in 2004 was 
8,474 yuan or 67 per cent of the national average, while that of the western 
regions was 7,430 yuan or 59 per cent of the national average, and only 38 
per cent of the eastern regions’. Similarly, both urban and rural income 
levels were seen to decline from the eastern to western regions. In the 
inland regions, the disposable income per urban resident in 2004 was 7,929 
yuan (84 per cent of the national average) and the net income per farmer 
was 2,389 yuan (81 per cent of the national average), while the 
corresponding figures for the western regions (including Guangxi and Inner 
Mongolia) were 7,996 yuan (85 per cent of the national average) and 2,136 
yuan (73 per cent of the national average) respectively. 
 
On the subject of farm versus non-farm income, a study worth noting 
is the detailed model constructed by Zhang (1998, 2001) that confirmed the 
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 fact that the off-farm incomes of developed areas are more significant than 
their farm incomes and except for the four most developed areas in the 
survey – Beijing, Guangdong, Jiangsu and Zhejiang (some places, like 
Shanghai, were for certain reason not included in the survey) – the incomes 
of most provinces are from farming [see Zhang (2001: 218), Table 9.3]. 
Among other results, Zhang’s study shows that for instance on average in 
Beijing a household will have 137 per cent more income than a household 
in Gansu, the poorest province in China, whereas a household in Zhejiang 
will have 82 per cent more income than one in Gansu. However, in the case 
of farm incomes, an average Beijing farming household will have only 16 
per cent more income than a farming household in Gansu, and a farming 
household in Zhejiang will have 46 per cent more income than one in 
Gansu. Since more developed regions have much more non-farm income 
compared to underdeveloped regions, a household in Beijing will have 211 
per cent more non-farm income than a household in Gansu, and a 
household in Zhejiang will have 122 per cent more non-farm income than 
one in Gansu.6
 
Zhang’s model reveals that geographical factors do affect 
substantially both total income and farm income, as it can be observed that 
total income on the plains is 23 per cent higher than that of the mountainous 
areas, and total income of hilly land is 9 per cent higher than that of the 
mountainous areas. On the other hand, farm income in the plain regions is 
29 per cent higher than that in the mountainous regions, while that of the 
hilly land is 10 per cent higher than that in the mountainous areas. Such 
higher variations as compared to the case of the total household income 
imply that geographical factors indeed have a greater effect on farm income 
than on off-farm income which these factors actually was found to have no 
direct relationship with. 
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 The “old liberated areas”, “frontier areas” and “ethnic minority areas” 
– three spatial/policy entities included in the model besides the provinces 
and zhixiashi – are characterized by low income vis-à-vis other regions. The 
“ethnic minority areas” appear to be the key problem areas, suffering 
especially from low off-farm income. The poor counties have three negative 
symbols (so do the “old liberated areas” and “minority areas”) in the model, 
highlighting their backwardness vis-à-vis other regions, the gap in farm 
income being 15 per cent and that in off-farm income as high as 39 per cent. 
The model also highlighted the importance of geographical factors in 
influencing the interregional differentials in total local income, especially the 
comparative advantage of the central regions over the western regions in 
terms of land resources and the eastern regions’ advantage in greater 
industrialization of the countryside vis-à-vis the western regions. Hence the 
disparity between the eastern regions and the western regions is chiefly in 
off-farm income, whereas that between the central regions and the western 
regions is mainly in farm income. This is reflected in the influence of eastern 
regions, ceteris paribus, on their off-farm and farm incomes at 135 per cent 
and 41 per cent respectively vis-à-vis the western regions, compared to that 
of the central regions at 24 per cent and 27 per cent vis-à-vis the western 
regions. That of the eastern regions on their total incomes is 68 per cent 
vis-à-vis the western regions, and that of the central regions is 29 per cent 
(Zhang 1998: 6, cited in Cook and Murray 2001: 87). 
 
The income differential between rural industry and farming stems 
mainly from the industrialization process, as township industry offers high 
level of employment opportunities in more developed regions leading to 
household income from industrial sources much higher than from farming, 
an aspect that the less developed regions obviously lag behind, given the 
limited industrial employment opportunities for their farmers. 
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 Table 5 China: Industrial and Employment Structures by Region 
 
Inland    
Region 
                                   
Item 
 
 
National Total 
 
Eastern (Coastal)* 
 
Inland# Central** Western# 
Year 2003 2004 2003 2004 2003 2004 2003 2004 2003 2004 
Primary 12.67 12.80 9.21 9.09 17.55 18.02 16.28 17.03 19.39 19.46 
Second
ary 
49.00 50.50 51.18 52.86 45.93 47.20 48.05 49.16 42.85 44.34 
Industrial 
structure 
(%) 
Tertiary 38.33 36.69 39.60 38.05 36.53 34.79 35.68 33.82 37.76 36.20 
Primary - - -3.46 -3.72 4.87 5.21 3.60 4.22 6.71 6.66 
Second
ary 
- - 2.18 2.36 -3.08 -3.31 -0.96 -1.35 -6.15 -6.17 
Comparis
on with 
national 
industrial 
structure 
(% 
points) 
Tertiary - - 1.28 1.36 -1.80 -1.91 -2.65 -2.88 -0.56 -0.49 
Primary 49.01 46.91 38.11 35.74 55.83 54.01 53.80 51.76 58.11 56.54 
Second
ary 
21.60 22.50 29.80 30.93 16.47 17.15 18.76 19.69 13.89 14.28 
Employm
ent 
structure 
(%) Tertiary 29.39 30.59 32.09 33.33 27.71 28.85 27.44 28.55 28.01 29.18 
Primary - - -10.9 -11.18 6.82 7.09 4.79 4.85 9.1 9.62 
Second
ary 
- - 8.2 8.43 -5.13 -5.35 -2.84 -2.81 -7.71 -8.22 
Comparis
on with 
national 
employm
ent 
structure 
(% 
points) 
Tertiary - - 2.7 2.74 -1.68 -1.74 -1.95 -2.04 -1.38 -1.41 
    
# Including Guangxi which is geographically eastern coastal, and 
Inner Mongolia which is geographically northeastern inland. 
* Excluding Guangxi. 
** Excluding Inner Mongolia. 
Source: Computed with data from the China Statistical Yearbook, 
various years. 
 
Table 5 above shows that the primary industry accounted for 18.02 
per cent of the inland regions’ GDP in 2004, which exceeded the national 
average by 5.21 percentage points, whereas the ratios for the secondary 
(47.20 per cent) and the tertiary (34.79 per cent) industries were 3.31 points 
and 1.91 points respectively below the national average. The disparity was 
even greater in the case of the western regions, where the ratio of primary 
industry to GDP was 19.46 per cent, i.e. 6.66 points above the national 
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 average, while the ratios for the secondary (44.34 per cent) and tertiary 
(36.20 per cent) industries were 6.17 points and 0.49 points respectively 
short of the national average. 
 
In terms of employment, labour force in the primary industry 
accounted for 54.01 per cent of the inland regions’ total labour force in 2004, 
which exceeded the national average for primary industry labour force by 
7.09 points, whereas the ratios of the labour force in the secondary (17.15 
per cent) and the tertiary (28.85 per cent) industries were 5.35 points and 
1.74 points respectively below the national average. The disparity was even 
greater in the case of the western regions, where the ratio of labour force in 
the primary industry (56.54 per cent) was 9.62 points above the national 
average. These statistics, on the other hand, also reflect the general 
widening disparities in urban and rural incomes, with the latter experiencing 
slower growth rates in the late 1990s and the early 21st century (Table 6). 
     
Table 6 China:  Income Growth Rates in Rural Areas 
 
Year Growth Rate 
(%) 
Year Growth Rate 
(%) 
1996 9 2000 2.1 
1997 4.6 2001 4.2 
1998 4.3 2002 4.5 
1999 3.8 2003 4.8 
 
Source: Tabulated with data from Zhou (2006: 288). 
 
A more detailed scrutiny of rural employment and wage at the sub-
national unit level is that by Zhang (1998, 2001) who found the Gini 
coefficient (between provinces/zizhiqu/zhixiashi) for rural industrial 
employment rate to be 0.48 in 1988 and 0.46 in 1995, and that for average 
monthly wage of township enterprise workers to be 0.12 in 1988 and 0.28 in 
1995 [see Zhang (2001: 226), Table 9.7]. Based on the Gini coefficient for 
wage levels that shows widening interregional disparities, Zhang concludes, 
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 in line with a World Bank study of 1997, “China is one of the worst countries 
in Asia in regards to regional inequality” (Zhang 1998: 10, cited in Cook and 
Murray 2001: 89). 
 
 
Inequality, Economic Malaise and the Menace of Socioracial Conflict 
 
One of the most important indicators of economic malaise is rising 
unemployment. Unemployment in China is officially defined as those 
unemployed residents in cities and towns, and those who registered at 
State job centres. Following more closely the international standard, the 
official definition was clarified from 2003 as those within working age 
(between 16 and 60 years for males, and 16 to 55 for females), are capable 
of working but unable to find employment, and the 2003 official 
unemployment rate for urban residents was 4.3 per cent, not including 
workers in the category of xia gang7. In 2002, there were about 4.12 million 
xia gang workers at State enterprises. With the exclusion of many 
categories (such as the xia gang workers and surplus farm workers), the 
accuracy of the official unemployment figure is questionable. Real 
unemployment rate has been calculated to be above 11 per cent, according 
to the World Bank, to as high as 20 per cent (Cook and Murray 2001: 36). 
Rising unemployment inevitably brings along the threat of labour unrest. 
Even as early as 1996, the government admitted that there had been 3000 
incidents of worker protest, and with as many as thirty million employees 
planned to be retrenched from the State-owned enterprises, this did not 
auger well for social stability, as some observers noted in 1999: 
 
The reaction of the workers has been far from passive. According to 
the Chinese Academy of Social Science’s annual report on social issues, an 
average of nine explosions rocked the mainland each day in 1998 as part of 
a growing crime wave. By early March 1999, there had been 13 bomb 
explosions this year, killing thirty-three people and injuring more than 100. 
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 The report blamed rising crime on joblessness, widening income disparity 
and anger at rampant corruption for this trend. (Cook and Murray 1999: 4) 
 
It was reported that in 2005 public order disturbances rose 6.6 per 
cent to 87,000, or an average of almost 240 a day.8  
 
Equally alarming is a series of unrest with an ethnoreligious or 
ethnoregional content or a mix of the two. A most notable of such incidents 
is the Han-Hui conflict in October 2004 that occurred in the Nanren village 
and two other nearby villages in Henan province, that allegedly killed more 
than 100 people including at least 15 policemen, and injured more than 400 
people, and at one point threatened to draw thousands more into the frenzy, 
thanks to the cellphones and computers that proliferate even in rural China.9 
Though the conflict was probably triggered by a local traffic accident, 
simmering tensions might have been exacerbated by China's economic 
success that led to a growing gap between rich and poor, especially in the 
countryside. 
 
That economic situations play an important role in interethnic conflict 
seems obvious. Collins (1975: 389-390) believed that the more severe a 
(political/economic) crisis, the greater the tendency for groups to coalesce 
along the lines of collective interests and the society to polarize into two-
sided conflicts. Van Evera (1994: 9) claimed that the publics become 
receptive to scapegoat myths (which are more widely believed) when 
economic conditions deteriorate. Rex (1970) noted that scapegoating is a 
means to restore social equilibrium, a mechanism whereby resentment may 
be expressed and the existing power structure maintained. It is "the social 
process par excellence that literally fulfils Parsons' description of one of his 
functional subsystems as pattern maintenance and tension management" 
(ibid.: 45). Baimbridge, Burkitt and Macey (1994: 432) observed that the 
deflationary impact of the Maastricht Treaty may intensify nationalism, 
racism and anti-Semitism "as the economically insecure seek weaker 
Asia Research Centre, CBS, Copenhagen Discussion Papers 2006- 12                                                    
 
17
 scapegoats to blame for the economic problems confronting them". Hauser 
and Hauser (1972) stated that scapegoats occur when there is an 
imbalance between power and citizens' rights and are "often an élite's 
safeguard in its dealings with a dissatisfied and potentially dangerous 
majority" (p.330).  In other words, the repressed, negative and hostile 
feelings of the majority vis-à-vis its own ruling élite are transferred on to the 
scapegoat.  The interethnic hostilities in Malaysia in 1969 (and to a certain 
extent also the boiling racial tensions in 1987) could in the main be rooted in 
the resentment of the demographic majority’s lower-class directed at their 
own ruling élites who were perceived to cooperate with and protecting rich 
interests of the minority. Similar outbursts could be observed amidst the 
anti-Suharto campaigns in Indonesia before the regime’s collapse in which 
Chinese commercial institutions were attacked. In the extreme case, the 
scapegoat may seem to be totally unrelated to the initial cause of the 
feelings of hostility. The term "free-floating aggression" has been used in 
this case while the more general concept of "scapegoating" is reserved for 
the transfer of hostility towards any object (Turner and Killian 1957: 19). The 
pattern of ethnic conflict caused by scapegoating may not be solely a racial 
problem, but may partly result from social class differential and the 
economic environment. In the case of Malaysia, Mauzy (1993) noted that 
rapid economic growth could be the most important variable in explaining 
the absence of ethnic violence (as occurred in Lebanon and Sri Lanka) in 
response to preferential policies that led to growing ethnic polarization. 
Every non-Malay she interviewed between October and December 1990 
"cited the continued possibilities of making money as the chief reason why 
there has been no ethnic violence in Malaysia, despite more polarisation, 
less accommodation and more repression" (ibid.: 127). 
 
As the case of the socioracial conflict in Henan in October 2004 
testified, a general increase in unrest in rural areas might also have been 
fuelled by dissatisfaction over poverty and corruption, perceived inequality 
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 in the distribution of resources in favour of the Han, and backlash against 
certain preferential policies for the minorities.10  Then there is the long-
running, simmering, tension and hostility in Xinjiang and Tibet, where 
especially in Xinjiang, it had increasingly been taking on a mixed 
ethnoreligious and ethnoterritorial flavour. While the vast ethnic minority 
area that covers Shaanxi, Ningxia, Gansu, Qinghai and Xinjiang continues 
to lag further and further behind the rest of the country since market-
oriented economic reforms were introduced in the late 1970s, the realization 
by the central government in Beijing lately that the region is the treasure 
trove of mineral wealth has probably helped to change its attitude towards 
the area: 
 
Three of China’s four largest coal fields are in this area, as well as 
four of the most important oil fields. Some 140 kinds of mineral ores have 
been detected along with large reserves of bauxite for processing into 
aluminium, and gold. The Qaidam Basin in the middle of Qinghai Province, 
home to a large Tibetan population, for example, is described by local 
officials as the province’s “treasure bowl”, containing proven oil reserves of 
200 million tons, as well as 4.5 billion tons of mostly high-quality coal with 
low ash and sulphur content. Under the Kunlun and Qilian mountains are 
large proven caches of iron, manganese, chromium, vanadium, copper, 
lead, zinc, nickel, tin, molybdenum, antimony, mercury, gold, silver, 
platinum, beryllium and selenium. The iron reserves are estimated at 2.2 
billion tons, and the province claims the country’s largest lead and zinc 
mines, and is a primary producer of asbestos. The Hui people in the Ningxia 
Hui Autonomous Region, meanwhile, are sitting on large proven reserves of 
oil and natural gas, along with mineral resources such as copper, iron, silver, 
gold, aluminium and nickel. The growing prosperity of Xinjiang is being built 
on the back of developments in the vast and inhospitable Tarim Basin, 
where experts reckon there are reserves of up to 100 billion barrels of oil 
and 8,300 billion cubic metres of natural gas. (Cook and Murray 2001: 126-
7)  
 
And all these in the regions with long simmering threat of ethnic 
separatism. To understand fully China’s central State’s unwavering position 
regarding such ethnoregional separatist sentiments, it is not enough to 
attribute it, as quite often done, to “China’s obsession with national security 
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 and the integrity of its historical borders” (ibid.: 147). Instead, one needs to 
go back to the fundamental tenets of Marxism-Leninism: 
 
Marxist-Leninist theory on the national question defines a 
methodology for dealing with specific questions concerning the status of 
communities called nations or nationalities … According to Communists, the 
fundamental cleavages of world society are along class rather than national 
lines. “Nations” are artificial units which came into being with the rise of 
capitalism and which are destined to disappear when capitalism is replaced 
with Communism; nationalism is a club used by capitalists to keep the world 
proletariat divided and subdued. When the proletariat seizes power 
throughout the world, then, according to the theory, nations and nationalism 
will vanish … when one realizes that more than half the population of 
Russia at the time of the October Revolution consisted of peoples other 
than the Great Russians, and that more than half the territory of China 
“liberated” in 1949-1950 was inhabited by peoples other than Han Chinese, 
it will be appreciated how immensely important the national question was to 
the success of both revolutions. The national question has been central, not 
peripheral, to the revolutions in both countries … In concrete terms, what 
“Marxist-Leninist theory on the national question” as applied in Russia and 
China really means is that claims for national independence on the part of 
minorities in socialist countries is [sic] counter-revolutionary, and only in 
capitalist and colonial countries are such claims correct. Once the 
Communist Party, the vanguard of the proletariat, seizes power, then the 
oppression of one nationality by another is impossible; anyone still 
demanding independence, therefore, can only be an agent, witting or 
unwitting, of world imperialism and therefore an enemy of “the people.” By 
similar arguments it is demonstrated that national minorities do not need 
their own Communist parties, since their interests are abundantly 
guaranteed by the unique Communist Party of the country. (Moseley 1966: 
4-7) 
 
The fact remains that with the disintegration of the Russian empire 
(the “prison of nations” 11 , or in its modern form, the Soviet Union) in 
December 1991, China became the world’s only former empire that has not 
disintegrated as have, besides the Russian empire, all in the 20th century, 
the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian and the Western maritime empires. The 
only ethnic region that managed to break away from China is Outer 
Mongolia that formed the independent Mongolian People’s Republic in 1924, 
with Russian support, though not recognized by China until 1946. The 
Uygurs in fact established, with Russian help, a short-lived East Turkestan 
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 Republic in 1944, but it collapsed after the 1949 Communist victory in 
China’s civil war, and the region was reincorporated into China as the 
Xinjiang Uygur Zizhiqu in 1955. Like the de facto independent Taiwan since 
1949, with the collapse of the Qing Dynasty that led to the repatriation of the 
imperial troops from the region, Tibet (today China’s Xizang Zizhiqu) was in 
every respect virtually on her own from 1911 to 1950. Hence, with such 
recent historical experience of ethnoregional sectionalism and potential 
separatism, it can be argued that as a political urgency China has no choice 
but to give due politico-economic consideration to her western regions – 
regions that are populated by many ethnic minorities and have alarmingly 
lagged behind during the market-oriented reforms – for the sake of 
sociopolitical stability that is deemed crucial to the security of the Chinese 
state. 
 
 
Ethnic Diversity in China 
 
Before we go further with the issues of ethnoterritoriality and China’s 
regional policy, one question needs to be asked: Just how diverse is China 
in terms of her ethnic composition? 
 
A comparison of China’s and Malaysia’s positions brings out readily 
the high homogeneity of the former’s ethnic composition (0.125) vis-à-vis 
the latter’s heterogeneity (0.684). 12  Nevertheless, there are various 
important aspects of the ethnic equation that are not revealed by an index 
of this nature (being based on the numerical structure of ethnic 
composition), including the historical geography of ethnicity, as well as the 
territorial, political and economic dimensions. Due to the abnormal size of 
China’s population and in particular the size of China’s citizens of the Han 
ethnicity, a distortion or misrepresentation emerges in the application of this 
index to China as the country’s large populations of minorities13 – about 110 
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 million in total, including the 16 million Zhuang, 10 million Manchu, 9 million 
Hui, 8 million Uygurs, 5 million Mongols and 5 million Tibetans – are 
practically dwarfed almost to invisibility by the sheer size of the Han 
population, as is evident in Table 7 below. In fact, based on the "critical 
mass" theory (advanced, among others, by Semyonov and Tyree [1981]), 
societies are considered multiethnic only if minorities constitute more than 
ten per cent of their population. It is thus obvious that the issue of 
"numerical significance" cannot be the sole criterion involved in the anomaly 
of China.  
 
Nevertheless, to get the real picture of China’s ethnic mosaic, such 
national-level statistics is obviously inadequate. To do so, one needs to go 
below the broad national image to examine the country’s sub-national units 
whose degrees of ethnic diversity are shown in Table 8. 
 
Table 7 China:  Ethnic Composition – The National Picture 
 
1 Han 92%  29 Tu 0.017% 
2 Zhuang 1%  30 Xibo 0.015% 
3 Manchu 0.9%  31 Mulao 0.014% 
4 Hui 0.8%  32 Khalkh 0.013% 
5 Miao 0.7%  33 Tahur 0.0108% 
6 Uygur 0.63%  34 Jingpo 0.0106% 
7 Yi 0.58%  35 Sala 0.0077% 
8 Tujia 0.51%  36 Bulang 0.0073% 
9 Mongol 0.43%  37 Maonan 0.006% 
10 Tibetan 0.41%  38 Tajik 0.0029% 
11 Buyi 0.23%  39 Pumi 0.0026% 
12 Dong 0.22%  40 Achang 0.0025% 
13 Yao 0.19%  41 Nu 0.0024% 
14 Korean 0.17%  42 Ewenki 0.0023% 
15 Bai 0.14%  43 Kinh (Vietnamese) 0.0017% 
16 Hani 0.11%  44 Jinuo 0.0016% 
17 Li 0.0985%  45 Deang 0.0014% 
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 18 Kazakh 0.0983%  46 Uzbek 0.0013% 
19 Dai 0.091%  47 Russian 0.0012% 
20 She 0.06%  48 Yugu 0.00109% 
21 Lisu 0.05%  49 Baoan 0.00103% 
22 Gelao 0.039%  50 Olunchun 0.00062% 
23 Lahu 0.036%  51 Menba 0.00066% 
24 Dongxiang 0.033%  52 Dulong 0.00052% 
25 Wa 0.0312%  53 Tatar 0.00045% 
26 Shui 0.0307%  54 Hezhe 0.00038% 
27 Naxi 0.025%  55 Gaoshan 0.00025% 
28 Qiang 0.018%  56 Luboa 0.00021% 
 
Source: Computed with census data. 
 
Table 8 China:  Ethnic Diversity by Province (sheng), Zizhiqu+ 
and Zhixiashi++ (Ethnic Fractionalization Index)14
 
Rank Province/Zizhiqu/Zhixiashi EFI  Rank Province/Zizhiqu/Zhixiashi EFI 
1 Xinjiang* (Uygur Zizhiqu) 0.632  16 Hubei 0.078 
2 Guangxi* (Zhuang Zizhiqu) 0.631  17 Beijing (Zhixiashi) 0.075 
3 Qinghai* 0.602  18 Hebei 0.077 
4 Yunnan* 0.541  19 Tianjin (Zhixiashi) 0.045 
5 Guizhou* 0.540  20 Fujian 0.031 
6 Ningxia* (Hui Zizhiqu) 0.447  21 Henan 0.023 
7 InnerMongolia* (Mongol 
Zizhiqu) 
0.326  22 Shandong 0.012 
8 Hainan 0.311  23 Anhui 0.011 
9 Liaoning 0.288  24 Guangdong 0.011 
10 Jilin 0.194  25 Zhejiang 0.010 
11 Gansu* 0.156  26 Shanghai (Zhixiashi) 0.010 
12 Hunan 0.152  27 Shaanxi* 0.009 
13 Heilongjiang 0.110  28 Shanxi 0.006 
14 Sichuan* # 0.089  29 Jiangxi 0.005 
15 Xizang/Tibet* (Tibetan Zizhiqu) 0.085  30 Jiangsu 0.005 
+ “autonomous region” ++“direct-ruled/independent municipality”, i.e. 
municipality under the central government. 
* provinces, zizhiqu, and zhixiashi now classified as the “western 
regions” 
# Sichuan includes Chongqing. 
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 Source:  Computed with census data. 
 
It can be noted in Table 8 above15 that the top seven regions in the 
ethnic diversity rankings are regions now classified as western under the 
“Develop the West” strategy. They include four of the five ethnic zizhiqu of 
China. Xinjiang – one of the two politically most volatile regions of the 
country (the other being Tibet) – tops the list.  
 
To further understand the ethnic mosaic of China, look at Table 9 
that indicates the proportion of each ethnic group in the country’s sub-
national units. Only those groups that are not lower than one per cent are 
shown in this table.  
 
Table 9 China:  Ethnic Distribution by Province (sheng), Zizhiqu+ 
and Zhixiashi++ (%)@ 
 
1 Xinjiang* (Uygur Zizhiqu) Uygur 47%; Han 38%; Kazakh 7%; Hui 5%; Khalkh 
1%; Mongol 1% 
2 Guangxi* (Zhuang Zizhiqu) Han 61%; Zhuang 37%; Yao 3%; Miao 1%; Dong 1% 
3 Qinghai* Han 58%; Tibetan 20%; Hui 14%; Tu 4%; Sala 2%; 
Mongol 2% 
4 Yunnan* Han 67%; Yi 11%; Bai 4%; Hani 3%; Dai 3%; Zhuang 
3%; Miao 2%; Lisu 2%; Hui 1%, Lahu 1%; Wa 1%; 
Naxi 1% 
5 Guizhou* Han 67%; Miao 12%; Buyi 8%; Dong 4%; Tujia 3%; 
Yi 2%; Gelao 1%; Shui 1% 
6 Ningxia* (Hui Zizhiqu) Han 67%; Hui 33% 
7 InnerMongolia*(Mongol Zizhiqu) Han 81%; Mongol 16%; Manchu 2%; Hui 1% 
8 Hainan Han 83%; Li 16%; Miao 1% 
9 Liaoning Han 84%; Manchu 13%; Mongol 1%; Hui 1%; Korean 
1% 
10 Jilin Han 90%; Korean 5%; Manchu 4%; Mongol 1%  
11 Gansu* Han 92%; Hui 5%; Tibetan 2%; Dongxiang 1% 
12 Hunan Han 92%; Tujia 3%; Miao 3%; Dong 1%; Yao 1% 
13 Heilongjiang Han 94%; Manchu 3%; Korean 1% 
14 Sichuan* # Han 95%; Yi 2%; Tibetan 1%; Tujia 1% 
15 Xizang/Tibet* (Tibetan Zizhiqu) Tibetan 96%; Han 4% 
16 Hubei Han 96%; Tujia 3% 
17 Beijing (Zhixiashi) Han 96%; Hui 2%; Manchu 2% 
18 Hebei Han 96%; Manchu 3%; Hui 1% 
19 Tianjin (Zhixiashi) Han 98%; Hui 2% 
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20 Fujian Han 98%; She 1% 
21 Henan Han 99%; Hui 1% 
22 Shandong Han 99%; Hui 1% 
23 Anhui Han 99%; Hui 1% 
24 Guangdong Han 99% 
25 Zhejiang Han 99% 
26 Shanghai (Zhixiashi) Han 100% 
27 Shaanxi* Han 100% 
28 Shanxi Han 100% 
29 Jiangxi Han 100% 
30 Jiangsu Han 100% 
Notes to Table 15: 
+ “autonomous region”, ++ “direct-ruled/independent municipality”, i.e. 
municipality under the central government. 
@ Decimals are rounded to the nearest. Ethnic groups below 1 per 
cent are not shown. 
*provinces, zizhiqu, and zhixiashi now classified as the “western 
regions” 
 # Sichuan includes Chongqing. 
Source:  Computed with census data. 
 
An interesting fact that stands out in Table 9 is that the ethnic group 
whose name marks a particular zizhiqu may not be the demographically 
dominant group there. In Ningxia, Inner Mongolia and Guangxi, the Han 
Chinese constitute the dominant group (67, 83 and 61 per cent respectively), 
while the Hui, Mongol and Zhuang are in fact minorities in the respective 
zizhiqu (33, 16 and 37 per cent respectively). In Xinjiang, while the Uygur 
outnumber the Han, the former are hardly a majority, constituting less than 
50 per cent of the zizhiqu’s total population. Tibet is the oddity in the whole 
of China, with Tibetans constituting 96 per cent of the population, 
demographically dwarfing the Han to a mere 4 per cent. Such official 
population figures have been disputed by the Tibetan government-in-exile 
who claims that 
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 … accelerating Han population transfer into Tibet … has reduced the 
Tibetan people to a minority in their own land. Today, claims the 
government-in-exile, ‘there are over 7.5 million non-Tibetan settlers in Tibet 
including Chinese and Hui Muslims, compared to six million Tibetans.’ 
(Cook and Murray 2001: 141) 
 
However, such allegations of population transfer is rebutted by the 
Beijing government, who argues that 
 
the only Han Chinese living in Tibet are specialists who have gone 
there voluntarily to help in the region’s development. The Han, it maintains, 
make up less than five per cent of the population and many of the people 
are there for only a few years before returning home. (ibid.) 
 
 
“Develop the West” Strategy and Ethnoterritorial Challenges 
 
The term “development of the central and western regions” first 
emerged in the Chinese mass media in the spring of 1999. The phrase 
“Developing the Western Region” (xibu dakaifa) would soon become widely 
used in the political parlance. It has often been noted that the “Develop the 
West” strategy was a big gambit for Jiang Zemin, something that neither 
Mao Zedong nor Deng Xiaoping could do during their lifetime. Although the 
western regional development strategy might seem to be an easy way for 
Jiang to assert his authority ahead of the 16th Party Congress scheduled for 
the autumn of 2002, in parallel with thought control through ideological and 
political work, the plan was fraught of risks. While the strategy would cover 
many minority zizhiqu (“autonomous regions”) whose majority population 
are ethnolinguistically and/or ethnoreligiously distinctive from the Han 
Chinese central State, the plan has always been understood to be a political 
process to allocate pieces of the economic pie to the local governments in 
the western regions but not about political decentralization. 
 
Asia Research Centre, CBS, Copenhagen Discussion Papers 2006- 12                                                    
 
26
 However, implementing the western regional development project 
within such cautious political framework is not without risks either. First, with 
strong constraints in the devolvement of central power, it could be difficult to 
coordinate the interests of the central and local governments over the 
power of authorization and permissions and to determine how far the right 
to independent development could go. Besides that, it may not be easy to 
adjust the interests of local governments over limited financial resources 
and projects to be implemented. Finally, there is the fact that 80 per cent of 
the ethnic minorities in China live in the western regions and national border 
areas where the new regional development strategy is targeted. Without 
accompanying decentralization of political power and the conferring of 
substantial degree of regional autonomy in the control and use of local 
resources, ethnic minorities may perceive the central State’s projects as 
attempts at internal colonization, leading to their outright opposition to the 
whole regional development strategy itself, thus exacerbating the already 
simmering ethnoregional tensions. 
 
One researcher cited the reply of a Tibetan to his question about the 
prospects that “the opening of planned three railway lines to Lhasa should 
make the life in Tibet more convenient” during his visit to Tibet in March 
2000: “Many Han Chinese would come with the convenience of the railways. 
The bad influence of the Han Chinese culture could destroy Tibetan culture. 
We prefer staying poor to the destruction of our culture.” (Sasaki 2001: 27-8) 
If views as such are prevalent, this shows the possibility that many of the 
ethnic minorities are perturbed by the prospect of their cultures being 
destroyed or diluted as more and more visitors come to their regions due to 
the progress in the central government-led big development projects or by 
their own inability to adapt to the market economy. In another interview the 
same researcher conducted in Beijing in November 2000, he was told by a 
minority official working with a central government organization: “The 
biggest problem with the Strategy for Developing the Western Region is the 
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 neglect of rights of ethnic minorities, with development rights totally 
controlled by the central government. We are demanding independent 
rights of development. In funding, we want the freedom to form joint 
ventures with foreign companies. We also want trading rights for resources 
and processed products. The central government’s way will just bring 
resources from the West to the East, leaving nothing behind in autonomous 
regions. If we are given policy autonomy, we can manage economic 
development of autonomous regions much better than the central 
government as we have our own channels of doing things. As for an inflow 
of human resources, the central government would only bring in the Han 
Chinese. There are talented people among ethnic minorities and we can 
make good use of them. What we badly need is autonomy of development.” 
(ibid.: 26) 
 
Regardless of how widespread such discontent might be, the degree 
of policy autonomy in the ethnic regions is one issue that would present 
pitfalls for the “Develop the West” strategy that the central government 
cannot afford to callously dismiss. And such pitfalls can have real 
consequences for the success or failure of the strategy. In July 2000 the 
World Bank rejected a loan to China – a $40 million interest-free loan 
intended to finance a plan to move 58,000 Han Chinese living in Qinghai to 
the province’s Tibetan area as part of the poverty relief measures – after 
U.S.-based Tibet support groups and environmentalist groups, and 
reportedly China’s own ethnic minority, campaigned against the loan project, 
arguing about the possible threat to Tibetan influence and culture. The 
World Bank’s board of governors finally rejected the proposed loan after the 
bank’s examinations discovered the lack of both stringent standards for 
environmental assessment and of secrecy about hearings on residents of 
the area where the Han Chinese were to be moved. It can be argued that 
the rejection might not have been based completely on the threat to an 
ethnic minority’s culture but also carried political and diplomatic overtones 
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 since the United States and some European countries were among the 
countries that voted against the loan (ibid.: 27). Either way, the loan 
rejection had severe implications for the whole “Develop the West” strategy 
that China cannot afford to make lightly of since the country, due to the 
fiscal constraints of the central government, plans to rely on loans from 
international organizations and foreign governments in raising necessary 
funds for the development projects involved in the strategy. 
 
This points to the fact that a main problem China, at this particular 
stage of reform, is facing – which often has an ethnoterritorial overtone – is 
the issue of interregional disparities in income and wealth. Although the 
threat of interethnic mistrust looms large and wide and it could both be the 
scourge afflicting the poor nations, and the sword of Damocles even in 
times of prosperity16, it is nevertheless critically relevant to the developing 
countries in particular, since economic deprivation or desperate poverty 
“unduly heightens sensitivities and breeds a general atmosphere of 
unreasonableness and distrust, making it immensely more difficult to attain 
solutions to outstanding problems on the basis of a reasonable give and 
take” (Vasil 1984: 1-2). As a post-Marxist-Leninist country still on the road of 
market-oriented reforms, China cannot avoid to take heed of the impact of 
the twin perils of the reethnicization of social segments and the widening of 
inequalities as have occurred in Eastern Europe and the successor states 
of the former Soviet Union as well as the lessons from the Balkan conflicts 
after the collapse of communism, or what Raiklin (1988) more appropriately 
termed "totalitarian state capitalism", where social tensions are increasingly  
expressed and enacted ... as interethnic conflicts: conflicts  among  majority  
and  minorities; or as conflicts among competing minorities. (Gheorghe 
1991: 842)    
. 
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 The Political Economy of Regional Demarcation and Interregional 
Resource Contest 
 
In the past, China used to adopt the dichotomy of dividing the 
country into the coastal regions and the inland regions before she shifted in 
the mid-1980s to the trichotomous division of the country into the three 
major economic zones of the eastern, central and western regions, when 
regional diversity was formally recognized. With reference to the “Develop 
the West” strategy, the demarcation of the three regions is as follows: 
 
Eastern regions include 11 mainly coastal provinces/zhixiashi17 – 
Beijing (zhixiashi), Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan (the large island that 
attained province status after its separation from Guangdong), Hebei, 
Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shandong, Shanghai (zhixiashi), Tianjin (zhixiashi) and 
Zhejiang. 
 
Central regions include eight provinces – 
Anhui, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Jilin and Shanxi.  
 
Western regions include 12 provinces/zhixiashi/zizhiqu18: 
Chongqing (zhixiashi, after its separation from Sichuan province in the late 
1990s), Gansu, Guangxi (zizhiqu of the Zhuang ethnic minority), Guizhou, 
Nei Monggol (i.e. Inner Mongolia – zizhiqu of the Mongol ethnic minority), 
Ningxia (zizhiqu of the Hui ethnoreligious minority), Qinghai, Shaanxi, 
Sichuan, Xizang (i.e. Tibet – zizhiqu of the Tibetan ethnic minority), Xinjiang 
(zizhiqu of the Uygur ethnic minority) and.Yunnan.  
 
Thus, the central and western regions are largely comprised of the 
provinces (sheng)/zhixiashi/zizhiqu of the inland regions. It can also be 
noted that under the “Develop the West” strategy, all the ethnic minority 
zizhiqu (“autonomous regions”) are categorized as western regions. 
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 Such regional demarcations are by no means solely geographical, 
since other criteria such as the level of economic development, living 
standards and even bureaucratic customs are also taken into consideration. 
To be called “western” in this case carries the connotation of being remote, 
poor, and backward in economic development. Thus, for a region, to be 
classified as “western” or otherwise is not geographically destined, but 
rather subject to negotiations. For instance, whether to include the two 
ethnic minority regions of Guangxi Zizhiqu (of the Zhuang) and Inner 
Mongolia Zizhiqu (of the Mongols) as western regions posed some 
problems for the State Development and Planning Commission during the 
demarcation process, since geographically the southern province of 
Guangxi is not a landlocked inland province but partly coastal, adjacent to 
the prosperous Guangdong province, and has always been considered an 
eastern, coastal province, and Inner Mongolia is actually more central than 
western. The central government’s acceptance of Guangxi’s appeal for its 
status to be changed from eastern to western, citing a relatively backward 
economy and poverty in many of its counties, drew strong opposition from 
other regional governments such as Hubei and Hunan19, since such a 
change in status means that the formerly “eastern, coastal” Guangxi which 
has benefited in the past from favourable treatment during the period of 
development of the eastern coastal regions would now benefit again under 
the new “Develop the West” strategy by turning into a “western” region. 
Despite the objections, Guangxi’s ardent lobbying effort paid off. Taking a 
cue from Guangxi’s effort, Inner Mongolia follow suit. 20  The official 
rationales for the inclusion of the Guangxi Zhuang Zizhiqu and Inner 
Mongolia Zizhiqu as western regions are the fact that they are ethnic 
minority areas, that they are geographically bordering the “West”, that they 
are rich in natural resources but backward in economic development, and 
that they bear resemblances to the southwestern and northwestern regions. 
On the contrary, the “central regional” Hubei, Hunan and Shanxi provinces 
that sit on the line dividing the western and central regions all failed in their 
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 appeals to get included as western regions. The only consolation they got 
was that the Enshi Zizhizhou (“autonomous prefecture”) of Hubei and 
Xiangxi Zizhizhou of Hunan – the only ethnic minority areas (both are Tujia 
and Miao prefectures) of the respective provinces – were included as 
western regions, the result of a compromise between the central 
government and the two provinces. The absence of any ethnic minority 
“autonomous area” rendered the Shanxi province unable to benefit from 
such a compromise. (Sasaki 2001: 23) 
 
However, not all provinces with ethnic minorities were able to 
successfully persuade the commission to incorporate them as part of the 
western regions. Hainan province, the large island on the east coast, tried 
to get reclassified as “western”, citing its 35 ethnic minorities (see Table 14 
above) and an objective of the “Develop the West” strategy to develop 
ethnic minority areas. It failed. The same for Jilin province. Even with the 
precedence of Enshi and Xiangxi, the Yanbian Korean Zizhizhou still failed 
to persuade the central government to incorporate it as part of the western 
regions. 
 
What the above shows is that the geographical demarcation of the 
western regions is not an easy process, since being incorporated as a 
western region means that the regional government concerned would be 
entitled to receive various benefits, including priorities in obtaining projects 
funded by the central government and other fiscal subsidies. That explains 
why regional governments all over the country were swept into a frenzy 
trying to get their regions classified as “western” – in a course of events 
resembling the fiebre autonómica (autonomy fever) when the Spanish 
Comunidades Autónomas project was first introduced after the death of the 
Caudillo – no matter how unconvincing their arguments were. However, 
given the fiscal constraints of the central government, continued fiscal help 
from the central government could be problematic. Hence, fund-raising 
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 would depend on the ability to attract domestic- and foreign-capital 
enterprises. That explains why many regional governments had raced to 
announce preferential policy measures as soon as the proposal was made 
for the “Develop the West” strategy (ibid.: 24). Such interregional 
scrambling for future benefits even at the early stage of the strategy can 
provide one a glimpse into the potential resource contest between regions, 
especially given the understandable difficulty to coordinate and adjust the 
interests of regional governments over the distribution of the resources for 
the strategy. Such interregional resource contest could actually turn rather 
ugly, as the following case of local protectionism attests to: 
 
In July 2001, the local government of Wuxue, in Hubei province, 
issued a directive to call on all residents in the region to support their own 
beer brands and producers. They forced each and every government 
employee to buy at least six cases of local beers each year. In the 
meantime, distributors of other beer brands were summoned and penalized 
by various bureaux of the local government in the forms of fines and extra 
taxes. This kind of action is similar to the “buy local” campaigns in many 
countries yet different in its nature, since initiatives and actions were taken 
by governments rather than by a popular civil movement.(Zhou 2006: 247) 
 
Then there is the case where 
 
[a] well-known battle was fought between Hubei provincial 
government and Shanghai municipal government over market access for 
cars. Both regions have carmakers: Hubei has a joint venture with Citron; 
and Shanghai a joint venture with VW. The Shanghai government imposed 
an 80,000 yuan surcharge on buyers of Hubei-made cars. In retaliation, the 
Hubei government invented a 70,000 yuan fee payable when buying 
Shanghai-made Santanas. Cars made in these two regions failed to enter 
the other’s market. (ibid.) 
 
 
State’s Response to Interregional Disparity 
 
As noted earlier in the paper, ethnic composition marks one of the 
major differences between China’s eastern and western regions, and in 
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 contrast to the eastern regions that are dominated by the Han Chinese, the 
western regions are home to a large number of China’s ethnic minorities. 
When Jiang Zemin stressed the need for “national unity” in proposing the 
“Develop the West” strategy, he simply conveyed the government’s 
understanding of the need for different approaches in economic 
development strategy for the eastern and western regions due to the 
contrasting ethnic compositions of the two regions. Compounding the 
exigencies engendered by the ethnic factor is the interregional 
socioeconomic disparity between the Han-dominated eastern regions and 
the western regions where many non-Han peoples are domiciled. The 
paper has earlier begun by partly examining the issue in a section on 
poverty and equality. Since this is one of the most, if not the most, critical 
challenges China faces in her next phase of politico-socioeconomic 
development, it is fitting to end this paper by returning here to take a closer 
look at the issue of interregional disparity and how the State is responding 
to it under the “Develop the West” strategy. 
 
The more affluent eastern regions were directed since 1997 to form 
regular one-on-one cooperative links with western regions in the form of the 
following pairings: 
 
Beijing (zhixiashi) – Inner Mongolia (Mongol zizhiqu) 
Dalian, Qingdao, Ningbo (cities) – Guizhou (province) 
Fujian (province) – Ningxia (Hui zizhiqu) 
Jiangsu (province) – Shaanxi (province) 
Liaoning (province) – Qinghai (province) 
Shandong (province) – Xinjiang (Uygur zizhiqu) 
Shanghai (zhixiashi) – Yunnan (province) 
Tianjin (zhixiashi) – Gansu (province) 
Zhejiang (province) – Sichuan (province) 
All China – Xizang/Tibet (Tibetan zizhiqu)  
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 Tables 10 and 11 below may serve to remind one about the gap 
between the “giver” and the “receiver” in such a partner or sister relationship. 
 
Table 10 China:  GDP per capita by Province (sheng), Zizhiqu+ 
and Zhixiashi++ (yuan)  
 
Year 2003 2004  Year 2003 2004 
Shanghai 
(Zhixiashi) 
36533.08 42768.48  Chongqing* 
(Zhixiashi) 
7190.29 8537.44
Beijing 
(Zhixiashi) 
25151.74 28689.28  Hunan 6962.13 8379.01
Tianjin 
(Zhixiashi) 
24203.10 28631.64  Jiangxi 6653.28 8160.46
Zhejiang 20076.72 23819.92  Ningxia*  
(Hui Zizhiqu) 
6640.36 7829.08
Guangdong 17130.36 19315.34  Shaanxi* 6501.10 7782.75
Jiangsu 16825.73 20722.67  Xizang/Tibet* 
(TibetanZizhiqu) 
6829.03 7720.44
Fujian 15000.49 17240.50  Sichuan* 6271.34 7514.05
Shandong 13628.42 16874.43  Anhui 6197.16 7448.82
Liaoning 14257.81 16297.49  Guangxi* 
(ZhuangZizhiqu) 
5631.32 6790.96
Heilongjiang 11612.06 13893.11  Yunnan* 5634.18 6703.24
Hebei 10486.18 12878.23  Gansu* 5011.26 5952.39
Inner 
Mongolia* 
(Mongol 
Zizhiqu) 
9036.84 11376.17  Guizhou* 3504.47 4077.61
Xinjiang* 
(Uygur 
Zizhiqu) 
9708.68 11208.10    
Jilin 9330.25 10919.93  EASTERN 16306.33 19351.03
Hubei 9000.30 10488.56  CENTRAL 7775.41 9375.54
Hainan 8277.77 9405.38  WESTERN 6216.85 7429.95
Shanxi 7412.12 9122.67  INLAND 
(Central & 
Western) 
7053.83 8474.46
Henan 7291.39 9071.82    
Qinghai* 7310.04 8640.63  CHINA# 10558.20 12613.72
+ “autonomous region”, ++“direct-ruled/independent municipality”, i.e. 
municipality under the central government 
* provinces, zizhiqu, and zhixiashi now classified as the “western 
regions” 
# Excluding Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. 
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 Source:  Computed with data from the China Statistical Yearbook, 
various years. 
 
Table 11  China:  Regional GDP Shares (%) 
 
Inland  
Year 
 
 
Nation
al Total 
 
Eastern 
(Coastal)
* 
 
Inland# Central** Western# 
2000 100 57.29 42.71 25.58 17.13 
2001 100 57.50 42.50 25.41 17.09 
2002 100 57.91 42.09 24.92 17.16 
2003 100 58.49 41.51 24.57 16.94 
2004 100 58.38 41.62 24.72 16.90 
    
# Including Guangxi which is geographically eastern coastal, and 
Inner Mongolia which is geographically northeastern inland. 
* Excluding Guangxi. 
** Excluding Inner Mongolia. 
Source: Computed with data from the China Statistical Yearbook, 
various years. 
 
The partnership is established in a way that a “giver” (i.e. the more 
affluent) region has to provide concrete financial, personnel and 
technological assistance to a “receiver” (i.e. the less developed) region that 
in return, offers the “giver” business opportunities such as those based on 
the beneficiary region’s abundant endowment of natural resources. 
Examples are like Shanghai’s projects of water supply systems and 
hospitals in the Yunnan province and Tibet (Zhou 2006: 258). 
 
Besides the abovementioned one-on-one cooperative links, there are 
also general adjustments in investment focus aimed to address the long-
running interregional disparity in investment as shown in Tables 12 and 13. 
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 Table12 China: Cumulative Utilized FDI by Province (sheng), 
Zizhiqu+ and Zhixiashi++ (US$ billion), 1979-97 [Within category by 
alphabetical order] 
 
>5.625 to <50.912 >0.004 to <1.738 
Beijing (Zhixiashi) Gansu* 
Fujian Guizhou* 
Guangdong Jiangxi 
Jiangsu Jilin 
Liaoning Ningxia* (Hui Zizhiqu) 
Shanghai (Zhixiashi) Shanxi 
Shandong Shaanxi* 
Tianjin (Zhixiashi) Qinghai* 
Zhejiang Xinjiang* (Uygur Zizhiqu) 
 Yunnan* 
>1.738 to <5.625  
Anhui No data 
Guangxi* (Zhuang Zizhiqu) Inner Mongolia* (Mongol 
Zizhiqu) 
Hainan Xizang/Tibet* (Tibetan 
Zizhiqu) 
Hebei  
Heilongjiang  
Henan  
Hubei  
Hunan  
Sichuan* #  
 
+ “autonomous region”, ++“direct-ruled/independent municipality”, i.e. 
municipality under the central government 
* provinces, zizhiqu, and zhixiashi now classified as the “western 
regions” 
# Sichuan includes Chongqing 
Source:  Tabulated with data from Cook and Murray (2001: 83). 
 
Table 13 China: Foreign Direct Investment by Province (sheng), 
Zizhiqu+ and Zhixiashi++ (US$10,000), 2003 
Jiangsu 1056365 Sichuan* 41231
Guangdong 782294 Anhui 36720
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 Shandong 601617 Shaanxi* 33190
Shanghai 
(Zhixiashi) 
546849 Heilongjiang 32180
Zhejiang 498055 Chongqing* 
(Zhixiashi) 
26083
Liaoning 282410 Shanxi 21361
Fujian 259903 Jilin 19059
Beijing 
(Zhixiashi) 
219126 InnerMongolia* 
(Mongol Zizhiqu) 
8854 
Jiangxi 161202 Yunnan* 8384 
Hubei 156886 Guizhou* 4521 
Tianjin 
(Zhixiashi) 
153473 Qinghai* 2522 
Hunan 101835 Gansu* 2342 
Hebei 96405 Ningxia* (Hui 
Zizhiqu) 
1743 
Henan 53903 Xinjiang* 
(Uygur Zizhiqu) 
1534 
Hainan 42125 Xizang/Tibet* 
(Tibetan Zizhiqu) 
No 
data 
Guangxi* 
(Zhuang Zizhiqu) 
41856   
 
 + “autonomous region”, ++ “direct-ruled/independent municipality”, i.e. 
municipality under the central government 
* provinces, zizhiqu, and zhixiashi now classified as the “western 
regions” 
Source: Data from the China Statistical Yearbook. 
 
Tables 12 and 13 show respectively the cumulative utilized foreign 
direct investment, 1979-1997, and FDI in 2003, at 
provincial/zizhiqu/zhixiashi level. It can be observed in Table 13 that all of 
the provinces/zhixiashi with FDI above US$2 billion are eastern (coastal), 
whereas those provinces/zizhiqu with FDI below US$0.1 billion are all 
western regions. FDI in Guizhou, Qinghai and Gansu was just between 
US$0.02 billion and US$0.05 billion, while the figures for Ningxia and 
Xinjiang were below US$0.02 billion (the figure for Tibet was unavailable). 
The rankings by FDI here largely reflects that by GDP per capita (see Table 
10 above), suggesting unequivocally a correlation between the two. 
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 Interregional disparity in terms of export dependence and foreign capital 
utilization is further shown in Table 14 below. Onishi (2001), in a table taken 
from Chen (2000), shows that the interregional disparity in the share in 
basic construction investment during China’s 1st 5-year plan period (1953-
57) (East 36.9, Central 28.8, West 18.0) still persists by 1999 (East 52.1, 
Central 22.5, West 17.1).21 Concern for such mutually reinforcing factors 
has led to internal policy debates regarding the need to balance growth to a 
greater extent, and policy documents which “suggested that the state 
should further develop its regional compensation policy, improve its existing 
policy of “aid to poor areas”, strengthen policies for minority nationalities, 
and continue fiscal subsidies to compensate regional interests” (Cannon 
and Zhang 1996: 88, cited in Cook and Murray 2001: 82).  
 
Table 14 China: Regional Differences in Export Dependence, 
Foreign Direct Investment 
 
Inland                       Region 
                               
Item 
 
 
 
 
Year 
 
National 
Total 
 
Eastern 
(Coastal)
* 
 
Inland# Central** Western# 
2000 21.22 33.37 4.93 4.80 5.13 
2003 26.76 41.77 5.61 5.50 5.77 
Export dependence (%)^ 
2004 30.08 47.14 6.16 6.11 6.23 
Share of total foreign 
direct investment (%)+ 
2003 100 84.83 14.12 10.90 3.22 
 
# Including Guangxi which is geographically eastern coastal, and 
Inner Mongolia which is geographically northeastern inland. 
* Excluding Guangxi. 
** Excluding Inner Mongolia. 
^ Ratio of exports to GDP. 
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 + Regional shares of total foreign investment do not add to 100 
because they do not include the separate category of “Ministries and Other 
Departments” (1.05%). 
Source: Computed with data from the China Statistical Yearbook, 
various years. 
 
Under the “Develop the West” strategy, the government increased 
substantially its funding for the western regions and launched key 
investment projects in these regions with speedy approvals, and with 
transport, power, natural gas, and tourism being the industries of priority. 
These include 10 key projects that started in 2000, with an investment of 
over 100 billion yuan (around US$12 billion); other important projects that 
started in 2001, with total investment of over 300 billion yuan, partly 
supported by government treasury bonds of 50 billion yuan; 14 key projects 
in 2003 with total investment of 130 billion yuan (Zhou 2006: 259). A total 
funding of 700 billion yuan had been allocated to the west by late 2003. 
These huge projects, which will continue for up to a decade, besides 
providing job opportunities for workers in the western regions would also 
profit or help to maintain the solvency of many large State enterprises who 
are the major contractors of these projects. Besides the above measures, 
special government bonds were issued to support the ”Develop the West” 
strategy, and 60 per cent of international funds and low-interest foreign 
government loans were allocated to the western regions (ibid.). 
 
Another crucial measure under the “Develop the West” strategy is 
the improvement of investment environment in the western regions and the 
introduction of new preferential treatments for these regions. These can be 
seen as late corrective measures to reverse the past unfair neglect of the 
regions as shown in Table 15. 
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 Table15 China:Preferential Treatments – Inter-zonal Comparison 
 
Special economic zones 15% tax rate, lower tariffs 
Coastal open cities 24% 
Open cities along major rivers 24% 
Coastal economic development 
zones 
24% 
Economic and technology 
development zones 
10-15%, right to pass local laws to 
suit their needs 
National border open cities 24% 
Hi-tech industrial development 
zones 
15%, concession in land 
acquisitions 
Others 55% till 1993, 33% thereafter 
 
Source:  Tabulated with data from Zhou (2006: 253) 
 
Such unequal treatment had in fact further exacerbated the gap in 
economic competitiveness between regions over the years. In the mid-
1990s, the State Statistical Bureau ranked the economic competitiveness of 
provinces/zhixiashi/zizhiqu using a comprehensive method of assessment 
involving multiple factors. The results show that none of the 
provinces/zhixiashi/zizhiqu in the inland (i.e. central and western) regions 
was among the top ten. With the exception of Hubei and Sichuan, all 
provinces/zhixiashi/zizhiqu were ranked behind the midpoint (15th) (Chen 
2001: 33, Table 3). 
 
The gap in competitiveness may in a way be reflected in the 
following observations (Tables 16 and 17). 
 
Table 16 China:  Regional Shares of Industrial Output (%)+ 
 
Year 2003 2004 
National Total 100 100 
Eastern (Coastal)* 63.11 63.10 
Inland# 36.89 36.90 
Central** 23.61 23.45 Inland 
Western# 13.28 13.45 
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+ Gross domestic product of secondary industry excluding 
construction. 
# Including Guangxi which is geographically eastern coastal, and 
Inner Mongolia which is geographically northeastern inland. 
* Excluding Guangxi. 
** Excluding Inner Mongolia. 
Source: Computed with data from the China Statistical Yearbook, 
various years. 
 
Table 17 China: Famous Brands (1999) 
 
Eastern Regions 68 brand names 78% 
Central Regions 10 brand names 12% 
Western Regions 9 brand names 10% 
 
Source: Tabulated with data from Zhou (2006: 257). 
 
Measures to improve the investment environment in the western 
regions under the “Develop the West” strategy include assistance directed 
at solid targets like infrastructure and those aimed at soft targets such as 
business environment. In a way, measures and practices that had been 
tested in the eastern, coastal regions in the past few decades of reform are 
now being transplanted to the western regions. Within this framework, the 
western regions were granted in 2000 (for ten years till 2010) a preferential 
company income tax rate of only 15 per cent – the same rate long enjoyed 
by enterprises in the eastern regions (see Table 15 above) – and the power 
to approve foreign investment projects in service industries were conferred 
on the relevant authorities in the western regions. Other measures include 
the issuance of on-the-spot visas to foreign tourists to enhance tourism, and 
the adjustment of prices of minerals and railway transport. (Zhou 2006: 260). 
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 Conclusion 
 
The phenomenal rise of China as an economic power, as well as her 
heightened political and military clout that has been growing in tandem with 
this, inevitably brought forth, both regionally or globally, increasing concern 
over whether she is posing a threat to regional stability and prosperity, and 
if so, in what way. This paper has attempted to examine the so-called 
“China threat” from a different perspective, by asking whether the threat to 
China herself in the post-Cold War world and the oft-cited potential threat 
posed by China to her neighbours and to the world at large could in fact 
come from within China herself, engendered by her increasingly volatile 
interethnic relations owing to her breakneck economic transformation and 
the accompanying income and wealth disparities. The resultant intensified 
resource contest may see groups coalesce along ethnolinguistic and 
ethnoreligious lines and thus further polarized by such divides22, aggravated 
by transnational influences brought about by the selfsame globalization that 
has ironically contributed to her very economic “miracle” in the first place. 
The potential threat to China’s economic growth and political stability due to 
any mismanagement in her internal intergroup relations would also pose a 
threat to the world, in particular the country’s Southeast Asian neighbours in 
her backyard since their economic well-being is now very much tied to 
China’s rise as an economic power and the engine of growth in the region.23
Figure 1 
         Ethnic Diversity and Public Policy:  Interrelations 
 
Ethnic Diversity/Fragmentation                      Public Policy 
            
Preferential Policies 
   Decentralization 
 
          (Ethnogenesis/Reethnicization affecting 
           ethnic intensity/pluralism/sectionalism) 
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 It has been observed in this paper that the major challenges 
presently facing China’s central government come from within China herself, 
as manifest in the increasing number of protests that have erupted all over 
the country lately over issues like local government corruption, industrial 
disputes (including the loss of lives due to frequent mining accidents) and 
residential dislocation due to dam constructions or property development. 
While public protests with the scale of the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations 
seem remote, the increasingly anachronistic Communist one-party regime 
ultimately stakes its survival upon the continued robust economic growth 
and the effectiveness of authoritarian power,24 and how well it takes upon 
the task of redressing the mounting grievances simmering across China 
engendered by decades of uneven development since her headlong plunge 
into market-oriented reform, many of which carry increasingly worrying 
ethnic or ethnoregional overtones. However, many studies have forecast 
that it will take several decades for the economic disparity between the 
eastern, coastal regions and the inland, especially western, regions to start 
narrowing. One such study, that by the Institute of Quantitative and 
Technical Economics of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences predicted 
that the absolute disparity would gradually begin to narrow between 2010 
and 2030, but until then, the gap is estimated to widen further (Ohara 2001: 
63). 
 
Though predictions that the new regionalisms within China will give 
rise to the “China deconstructs” scenario (Goodman and Segal 1994; Cook 
& Li 1996) – in which China as we know it today would fragment into a host 
of “smaller Chinas” under the combined pressures of globalization, new 
regionalisms and ethnic dissent – seem at present to be rather far-fetched, 
the continuing devolvement of control to the provincial governments25 will 
inevitably lead to the reassertion of old regionalisms26 and the development 
of new regionalisms – the latter owing much to increased local autonomy, 
rapid economic growth and increasingly globalizing trade and business 
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 linkages – which in all probability could already be brewing right under our 
noses. 
 
The reassertion of old regionalisms and the development of new 
regionalisms in particular with an ethnic overtone have always constituted a 
challenge to countries facing an inevitable long-term prospect of 
decentralization and devolution27, as we have seen in the fiebre autonómica 
(autonomy fever) that threatened to bring about the virtual disappearance of 
the central Spanish State when the country’s Comunidades Autónomas 
(Autonomous Communities) project was first introduced after the death of 
the Caudillo, Generalísimo Francisco Franco y Bahamonde, in 1975. Even 
the fact that the Han command an unequivocal majority of 92 per cent of the 
total population of China needs not render the country immune to such 
threats. Even the most assimilated of minorities, the Zhuang whose ethnic 
consciousness was virtually created by the Han-dominated central 
Communist State in the early 1950s28, have begun to press for preferential 
treatments from the central government, as the country’s new reforms 
continue to widen economic disparities between the ethnic minorities and 
the Han majority, making it more and more challenging to manage ethnic 
nationalism and ethnoregionalism in the People’s Republic.29
 
 
Notes 
                                                          
1 This paper is prepared for the inaugural workshop of the research network: 
‘China in the World, the World in China (ChinaWorld)’ held by the Asia 
Research Centre, Copenhagen Business School on 10-11 March 2006. 
Works in progress. Please do not cite. 
 
2  Even the relatively isolated Fujian province, blocked by the Zhejiang 
province at the north and Guangdong province at the south, has a full 
length of coastal line for importing and exporting, and is a favourite 
destination for investors from across the Taiwan Strait (Taiwanese and 
Fujianese largely share the same regionalect) and among the Southeast 
Asian Chinese diaspora. 
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3  Bert Hoffman, “Access to Opportunity Eases Income Inequality”, The Star 
(Malaysian daily), 21 January 2006. 
 
4  “Counties with a relative concentration of the poor are designated by the 
State as “poor counties”, eligible to benefit from the government’s poverty 
relief policy measures. Designated as poor counties were ordinary counties 
with net income per capita of 150 yuan or less in 1985, “autonomous 
counties” of ethnic minorities with net income per capita of 200 yuan or less, 
and counties that were formerly bases of revolution with net income per 
capita of 300 yuan or less. In the adjustment made with the “State Seven-
Year Plan to Help 80 Million People Get Out of Poverty” in 1994, counties 
with net income per capita of 700 yuan or more were removed from the 
designation but all counties with per-capita net income of 400 yuan or less 
were added, if they were not designated previously, increasing the total 
number of designated counties to 592.” (Ohara 2001: 63-64, note 9) 
 
5  Cited in Ohara (2001: 56-57). 
 
6   The model was constructed for the Institute of Economics, Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences, 1995 survey. See Zhang (1998), cited in Cook 
and Murray (2001: 85-89), and Zhang (2001). 
 
7   The term “xia gang” refers to redundant workers mainly at State 
enterprises, without directly describing them as “unemployed”. Still officially 
attached to their work units or enterprises, the xia gang workers continue to 
receive basic minimum subsidies for their living and medical expenses, and 
are encouraged to change job, probably through State-run job and re-
employment centres, or go into small businesses. In line with State 
enterprise reforms, the number of xia gang workers has been on the rise: 4 
million in 1995, 8 million in 1996, 12 million in 1997, 16 million in 1998, 20 
million in 1999, though dropping to 11 million in 2001. (Zhou 2006: 289) 
 
8  “Taiwan offers China lessons in democracy”, The Star (Malaysian daily), 
21st May 2006. 
 
9  Jehangir Pocha, “Ethnic Tensions Smolder in China: Government blocks 
foreign journalists from reporting on Han-Hui riot”, In These Times, 
December 28, 2004, http://www.inthesetimes.com/site/main/article/1789 As 
usual, due to press restraints, casualty figures as such can never be verified. 
 
10  Ibid.; “Ethnic violence hits China region”, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3970611.stm 
 
11  Or “prison of the peoples”, as the Czarist empire has been called: 
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According to history, the Empire of the czars was a “prison of the peoples” 
and Lenin opened it. But history is never quite that simple. At the start of the 
twentieth century the empire was already showing signs of weakness; all its 
subject peoples were beginning to resent its domination and looking for 
ways to escape from it. Lenin’s genius lies in having grasped the breadth of 
these desires for emancipation, and in having understood that by utilizing 
those desires – which had nothing to do with the working class – he could 
assure the victory of the workers in his own country. 
(Carrère d’Encausse 1979: 13) 
 
12  See Yeoh (2003), Table 1. 
 
                             n     ni        ni - 1 
EFI = 1 - Σ  ( ---- ) (----------)    
                           i=1   N        N - 1 
 
where n  = the number of members of the ith group and N = the total 
number of people in the population (Yeoh 2003: 28). The index is 
constructed through the computational procedure of Rae and Taylor's index 
of fragmentation (F), defined as the probability that a randomly selected pair 
of individuals in a society will belong to different groups (Rae and Taylor 
1970: 22-3). The index varies from 0 to 1. The value is zero for a completely 
homogeneous country (the probability of belonging to different groups is nil). 
The value 1 occurs in the hypothetical society where each individual 
belongs to a different group. The fragmentation index is identical to Rae's 
measure of party system fractionalization (Rae 1967: 55-8) and 
Greenberg's measure of linguistic diversity (Greenberg 1956): 
 
            n 
A = 1 - Σ  ( Pi )²   where P = the proportion of total population in the ith 
language group. 
           i=1 
 
13  As noted by Gladney (1991: 6-7), due to the interchangeability of the 
terms “ethnicity” and “nationality” in the literature, there is much confusion 
over minority nationality identity in China. The term minzu is used for both 
concepts of nationality and ethnicity (or zhongzu) in China, the former being 
what the Chinese State has designated “56 nationalities”. While “ethnicity” 
should more rightly refer to an individual’s self-perceived identity, it is also 
often influenced by State policy. Gladney (ibid.) pointed out that in contrast 
to the limited term minzu (nationality/ethnicity”) used in China, Soviet 
ethnological vocabulary distinguished in Russian between ethnos, 
nationalnost, and narodnost (“ethnicity”, “nationality”, “peoplehood”) 
(Chapter 1, note 19). In other words, “nationality” (minzu) is what the 
Chinese State has conferred upon the 56 ethnic groups identified mainly in 
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the 1950s (ibid.: 6). This historical background explains a lot about China’s 
“national” policy till today.  
 
Leaving aside the Han-non-Han dichotomy, even the so-called “Han 
Chinese“ as a homogeneous ethnic group, whether phenotypically or 
culturally, may not be what it has always been taken for granted. The great 
diversity of the mutually unintelligible regionalects is well known. (The 
speakers of many of the Chinese regional languages are simply too 
numerous for the word “dialects” to be used as an appropriate term to 
designate their languages. For instance, the number of speakers of either 
Cantonese (Yue) or Hokkien/Fujianese (Min) is larger than the number of 
speakers of either Polish or Ukrainian, the two East European/Slavonic 
languages with most numerous speakers except Russian, or the speakers 
of Dutch, Danish, Norwegian and Swedish combined.) Regional 
differences – including the distinction between the wheat-eating northerners 
and rice-eating southerners – have always been observed, or as one 
observer noted, there are the  
 
… “Han” Chinese of south-coastal China who speak dialects other than 
Mandarin and who, in fact, sometimes refer to themselves as T’ang-jen 
(men of T’ang, after the T’ang dynasty, seventh to tenth centuries) rather 
than as Han-jen (after the Han dynasty, third century B.C. to third century 
A.D.) and … the “national minorities” in south China who have been to 
varying extents acculturated to Chinese ways – to the point, in some cases, 
that they had no awareness of being different, of being a “minority,” until 
they were informed of the fact by workers from the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences who came to their areas after 1949. 
(Moseley 1966: 9) 
 
In passing, “Mandarin” – the modern Chinese lingua franca – is actually the 
Western name for Huayu, the Chinese Standard Vernacular known in 
Mainland China as “putonghua” and in Taiwan as “Guoyu” (“Kuo-yu”). The 
term “Mandarin”, via Portuguese “mandarim”, has an obscure origin in 
Sanskrit “mantrin” (Hindi “mantri”, Malay “menteri”). It is not part of the 
Chinese vocabulary and often ridiculed by the Chinese as having been 
derived from “Man daren”, i.e. a “Manchurian minister”. 
 
14  For the nature and computational procedure of EFI, see note 13. 
 
15  The ethnic fractionalization index and the ethnic distribution figures in 
Tables 7–9 are computed with data from China’s 1990 Population Census. 
The author wishes to thank Miss Zhao Wenjie for her help in compiling the 
province/zizhiqu/zhixiashi-level detailed ethnic distribution data from the 
Census. 
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16 That the threat of ethnic unrest is not solely the bane of third world 
countries was highlighted by an observation by The Economist in 1965 that 
the sizzling ethnic tension in Malaysia and Singapore at that time coincided 
with a week of race riots in Los Angeles, as well as ethnic violence in 
southern Sudan (cited in Ehrlich and Feldman 1978: 1). 
 
17  “Direct-ruled/independent municipalities”, i.e. municipalities under the 
central government. 
 
18  “Autonomus regions”. 
 
19  It is not difficult to understand these provinces’ envy. Hubei and Hunan 
(as well as Shanxi), now considered as  “central”, are in fact sitting on the 
line separating the western and central regions. 
 
20   Although there are allegations that Guangxi’s and Inner Mongolia’s 
appeals were accepted because there was someone from Guangxi sitting 
on the Western Leading Group and leaders living in Beijing were disturbed 
by sandstorms that became increasingly serious because of the worsening 
desertification in Inner Mongolia that is close to Beijing, the fact is that the 
Ministry of Agriculture had argued for the inclusion of these two farming 
regions in the “West”, probably to expand its commitment to the western 
regional development (Sasaki 2001: 23). 
 
21  Onishi (2001: 7), Table 2. 
 
22   This is to take into consideration the two major dimensions of 
ethnopolitics – ethnic politics and the politics of ethnicity. Ethnic politics 
includes both government responses to challenges from ethnic communities 
and the efforts of ethnic organizations seeking to influence State policy, 
while the politics of ethnicity views ethnicity as a consequence of political 
action (Gheorghe, 1991). 
 
23  Another factor that needs to be considered is how such instability in 
China may affect the delicate balance in interethnic power configuration so 
far maintained in many of these Southeast Asian societies. 
 
24  “Powerful abroad, Fragile at Home” (Editorial), in China Goes Global, 
Financial Times’ Asia Insight series, 2005, p. 15. 
 
25  As Cannon and Zhang (1996) wryly noted: “the center pretends to rule 
and the provinces pretend to be ruled” (p.85, cited in Cook and Murray 2001: 
90). 
 
26  Sichuan was often noted as one of the centres of “old regionalism”, with 
potential for rebellion or upheaval centred upon its ancient cities such as 
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Chengdu (the capital of the province) and Chongqing. The province even 
proclaimed a “Declaration of Independence” in 1921 (Cook and Murray 
2001: 91). During the 1989 student-led pro-democracy movement that 
ended in the carnage around Beijing when the People’s Liberation Army 
clashed with Beijing residents and workers in support of the student 
demonstrators in the Tiananmen Square during the night of June 3rd–4th, 
1989, Chengdu was one of the major cities in China that witnessed large-
scale popular movement in support of the Beijing demonstrators. Zhou Enlai 
was said to have noted that Sichuan “always was the scene of turmoil 
before other provinces, and that order was always restored in that area later 
than the rest of the country” (Cook and Li 1996: 202). 
 
27  Paradoxically, further devolution in China that seems to be the logical 
extension of the already decentralist process of economic reform may yet 
be arrested by the lack of the will for political change – which is crucial to 
the maintenance of long-term stability – due to the illusory confidence 
brought about by economic success itself. 
 
28  See, for instance, Katherine Palmer Kaup’s Creating the Zhuang: Ethnic 
Politics in China (2000). 
 
29  A challenge that the unprecedented 2004 Han-Hui conflict in Henan had 
amply attested to.  
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